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A STUDY OF FREE ASSOCIATION BASED ON COLLIER’S THEORY 
OF CONSCIOUSNESS AS A REGULATORY FIELD
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION
To the individual, that which is denied from con­
sciousness is denied from existence. If one is not aware 
that he is afraid, then for him that feeling does not exist. 
In this way consciousness comes to represent reality to the 
individual. What one can accept into consciousness is for 
him reality; what one cannot accept into consciousness is 
for him not reality. As a character in a play by Jean 
Cocteau remarked, "What I don’t imagine doesn’t exist, or 
let us say it exists in some faraway place that doesn’t hurt 
so much" (19^8 , p. 765).
That feelings or impulses might very well motivate 
behavior, whether those feelings or impulses are consciously 
perceived or not, is a fundamental belief in dynamic psy­
chology. If an individual cannot accept into consciousness 
certain sensory, affective, or ideational processes, he can­
not control them in a constructive or effective way; he, 
instead, becomes controlled by them. On the other hand,
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the ability to accept into consciousness all such pro­
cesses which are representative of the individual at any 
given moment is considered to be the hallmark of the well- 
integrated, creative personality.
Within the last decade there has been an increasing 
amount of literature--particularly in the area of personal­
ity theory--that has greatly re-emphasized the role of man's 
dynamic consciousness. In this renewed interest in con­
sciousness there has been what appears to be a distinctly 
different approach. The emphasis is no longer on the origin 
of consciousness or its physiological basis, neither is it 
concerned with consciousness as an entity in itself. Rather 
the recent approaches are concerned with the role of con­
scious processes in the integration of the personality. The 
approach is a functional one. The "age old problem and con­
troversies" are avoided as much as possible (Collier, 1955» 
p. 270).
Consciousness is viewed in two ways: first, as a
field of consciousness, through which man becomes aware of 
himself and his world; and, second, as content, the immedi­
ate knowledge one has of his sensory, ideational, and af­
fective processes. This duplicity in meaning is not in 
itself new. James (190U) first advanced such an idea. The 
emphasis placed upon this interpretation of consciousness, 
in regard to the role of consciousness in the stability and 
effectiveness of the personality, does seem to be a new and
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widely developing trend.
Allport (1955)» Rogers (1950), Fromm (19^7)» May 
(1953), Angyal (19^1)» Maslow (1952), Lewin (Hall & Lindzey, 
1957), Goldstein (Hall & Lindzey, 1957), and other contem­
porary writers have placed a strong emphasis on "conscious­
ness of self," "self knowledge," "self feeling," and "self 
awareness." Awareness of self is seen as a necessary con­
dition for emotional stability; a lack of awareness of self 
is, on the other hand, an indication of emotional insta­
bility.
In his book, Man * s Search for Himself, May (1953) 
emphasizes the need for self awareness. May, as one of the 
leaders in existential psychology in this country, has con­
tinually stressed the importance of conscious processes in 
the integration of the personality:
Consciousness of self actually expands our control 
of our lives, and with that expanded power comes the 
capacity to let ourselves go. This is the truth behind 
the seeming paradox, that the more consciousness of 
one's self one has, the more spontaneous and creative 
one can be at the same time» . . . Consciousness of
self gives the power to stand outside the rigid chain 
of stimulus and response, to pause, and by that pause 
throw some weight on either side, to cast some decision 
about what that response will be (1953, p. 104^.
One's awareness of himself as an "actor" or "doer" 
permits him to approach the constructive regulation of his 
behavior. If one is not aware of his own feelings, values, 
needs, etc., he cannot do much in the way of controlling 
them or using them in constructive ways. The integrity of
k
the personality suffers in proportion to the degree that one 
must hide his individuality from himself.
The assertion of one's individuality in productive 
and self-enhancing ways can only come about when that in­
dividuality exists as unity. Maslow (19^2) has pointed out 
that many restraining aspects of our culture maJce the ac­
ceptance of certain feelings and impulses (e.g., sex, hos­
tility) "dangerous" to the individual, so that they are 
ignored, repressed, or displaced, destroying the basic 
unity and preventing the actualization of the self. One 
continually confronts individuals who have apparently never 
discovered their "selfhood." They have been caught up by 
the complex demands external to them and have been weakened 
by the restrictions and constraints which the culture has 
imposed on them. They seem heavily guarded against con­
sciously encountering themselves.
As an example of this lack of self awareness, many 
college freshmen, who face the task of defining their as­
pirations and aims, are prone to make their choices on the 
basis of what they see "out there." They are not aware of 
what is uniquely them, their feelings, their desires, their 
hopes. There is little differentiation between them and 
the world around them. There is a common tendency to not 
be unique, but rather to "snuggle down" into the herd. May 
describes this common tendency of man;
the personality suffers in proportion to the degree that one 
must hide his individuality from himself.
The assertion of one's individuality in productive 
and self-enhancing ways can only come about when that in­
dividuality exists as unity. Maslow (19^2) has pointed out 
that many restraining aspects of our culture make the ac­
ceptance of certain feelings and impulses (e.g., sex, hos­
tility) "dangerous" to the individual, so that they are 
ignored, repressed, or displaced, destroying the basic 
unity and preventing the actualization of the self. One 
continually confronts individuals who have apparently never 
discovered their "selfhood." They have been caught up by 
the complex demands external to them and have been weakened 
by the restrictions and constraints which the culture has 
imposed on them. They seem heavily guarded against con­
sciously encountering themselves.
As an example of this lack of self awareness, many 
college freshmen, who face the task of defining their as­
pirations and aims, are prone to make their choices on the 
basis of what they see "out there." They are not aware of 
what is uniquely them, their feelings, their desires, their 
hopes. There is little differentiation between them and 
the world around them. There is a common tendency to not 
be unique, but rather to "snuggle down" into the herd. May 
describes this common tendency of man;
Every human being gets much of his sense of 
his own reality out of what others say to him 
and think about him. But many modern people 
have gone so far in their dependence on others 
for their feeling of reality that they are 
afraid that without it they would lose the 
sense of their own existence. They feel they 
would be ’’dispersed,” like water flowing every 
which way on the sand. Many people are like 
blind men feeling their way along in life only 
by means of touching a succession of other 
people (l953j p. 32).
Under these conditions, something in the way of 
self regulation and direction is lost to group regulation. 
Self knowledge is lost in the quest for group acceptance. 
Flexibility and spontaneity are lost to conformity and 
the plague of everybody-does-it. When one cannot conscious­
ly accept himself as a unique, acting, and choosing "I," he 
generally becomes anxiously and morbidly concerned with the 
object "me."
Tillich (1953) has elaborated the idea that a great 
deal of personal security is needed to accept all the as­
pects of one's individuality. To the insecure, threatening 
processes arising within them must be avoided, always at the 
expense of flexibility and freedom. One's concern is turned 
away from the self, and the focus of one's existence becomes 
"what do they think of me?"; "how do they feel about me?"; 
"what do they want me to do?"; rather than "I feel," "I 
want," "I do."
Collier * s Theory of Consciousness 
as Regulatory Field
A systematic approach to this whole matter of the 
regulatory effectiyeness of consciousness has been deyeloped 
oyer the past seyeral years by Rex Collier (l955j 1956, 
1957a, 1957b). Under the general heading of "Consciousness 
as a Regulatory Field," Collier has restated many of the 
ideas of other contemporary writers in a systematic presen­
tation of ideas concerning personality, psychotherapy, and 
psychopathology. Collier's attempt to integrate the con­
temporary ideas concerning consciousness into a systematic 
approach clarifies and makes explicit what has been largely 
inexplicit in most personality theory. He draws from the 
work of Carl Rogers and the phenomenologists, as well as 
from psychoanalytic theorists. Collier has not presented a 
complete theory of personality, but he has presented what 
the writer feels is an effectiye frame of reference from 
which to yiew psychopathology and the psychotherapeutic 
process. As theory, Collier*s ideas haye some shortcomings. 
He has concerned himself with a subject which has perplexed 
and disturbed psychologists for a long time; and, while he 
presents his ideas in a generally lucid and systematic way, 
he has not yet achieyed a fully formulated theory of either 
psychopathology or psychotherapy. Perhaps this criticism 
is premature, since his theory is still in the process of 
formulation. At the present stage, howeyer, certain
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theoretical problems have not yet been faced (e.g., there 
is not much in the way of empirical definitions which would 
bring the elements of the theory more into definite contact 
with observational or measurable data). At this point, 
Collier's contribution should probably be viewed as a con­
sistent and reasonably simple framework which serves as a 
means of organizing and integrating much of what is believed 
about the dynamic role of conscious and unconscious processes 
in man's behavior. Whether Collier's work will become a 
full-blown theory of personality remains to be seen.
Since Collier's thinking serves as the theoretical 
framework for the present study, his theory is reviewed here 
at some length. The events which Collier represents in his 
writings are not new to personality theory; the conventions 
which he uses to relate and to organize these events are an 
extension and explication of some of the most fundamental 
beliefs in personality theory.
To Collier consciousness is a field of dynamically 
interacting variables. He defines consciousness function­
ally as a "broad bio-psychological field which allows the 
individual to increase his flexibility of adjustment in the 
presence of complex need patterns from within and complex 
demand patterns from without" (1955, p. 270). The individ­
ual's "flexibility of adjustment" is dependent upon the ex­
tent to which he can constructively assimilate within the 
conscious field the relevant internal and external factors
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at any particular moment. Thus, as far as Collier is con­
cerned, there are two significant aspects of the effective 
regulation of one's behavior. First, the ability to accept 
phenomena into the conscious field; and, second, the ability 
to assimilate or integrate one's conscious experiences so 
that the eventual outcome in behavior will be to the benefit 
of the individual. The former is the precondition for the 
latter.
By "field" Collier means "an organized and bounded 
region in which events occur in a patterned inter-relation­
ship" (1955) p. 270). Beyond the boundary of the conscious 
field are those factors which are "outside of awareness." 
"Consciousness" and "awareness" appear to be used quite 
synonymously, referring to the immediate knowledge which one 
has of his sensory, affective, and ideational processes at 
any given time.
Within the conscious field there are varying degrees 
of awareness. Consciousness and unconsciousness are not 
dealt with as representing a dichotomy, but rather as a 
continuum of awareness. As an analogy one might think of 
the visual field, which is "sharp, clear, fully detailed at 
the center, but progressively vaguer and less detailed toward 
its boundaries" (Gibson, 1950, p. 29). This central-to- 
peripheral gradient of clarity within the visual field is 
analogous to the gradient of awareness within the conscious 
field.
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The term "experience,” which Collier uses but does 
not define explicitly, is apparently used by him in the same 
way that Rogers (1950) employs the term. It refers to every­
thing that is going on within the organism at any given 
moment, including physiological processes, sensory impress­
ions, and motor activities, occurring at both conscious and 
unconscious levels. As part of the experience of the in­
dividual, certain feelings (e.g., anger or fear), subjective 
values (e.g., "I like it" or "I do not like it"), and basic 
needs (e.g., need for acceptance by others) accrue as a 
result of one’s interaction with the environment.
At times one’s feelings, values, and needs may become 
very threatening to him if they are incongruent with the 
concept which he has of himself; consequently, these aspects 
of experience may be precluded from consciousness. When an 
individual consciously perceives only a limited part of his 
psychologically significant experiences, he is likely to 
behave in ways which are unrealistic and even to his own 
detriment. This, of course, implies levels of discrimina­
tion below the level of consciousness or awareness. That 
is, aspects of experience can be perceived and organized 
outside of the conscious field.
Collier’s thesis is that self-regulation in a psy­
chological sense is characteristic of human behavior, just 
as self-regulation in a physiological sense is an active on­
going process. Collier speaks of self-regulation as being
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analogous to physiological homeostasis, but, though he sug­
gests that the relationship here may be more than one of 
analogy, he does not elaborate the meaning of this statement. 
One can see a relationship between what Collier implies and 
what Menninger (l95^a, 19^4b) has elaborated as the homeo­
static functions of the ego.
Consciousness provides the "field conditions" on a 
psychological level for the adaptive regulation of behavior. 
That is, if all the relevant aspects of one’s experience 
can be accepted into awareness and thus are available to 
the conscious field of interaction, the greater are the 
chances that the outcomes in behavior will be maximally 
representative of the total individual. Collier, like many 
contemporary theorists, believes that any behavior which is 
maximally representative of the total individual will be in 
the direction of ultimately enhancing or improving the self.
The conscious field as Collier conceptualizes it 
varies in the degree to which processes relevant to current 
events are accessible to the field. The magnitude of the 
conscious field is greatest when the person is maximally 
aware of his own experience. The greater the magnitude, 
the greater the efficacy of self-regulation. This is a 
point similar to a basic proposition of Rogers regarding 
symbolization at the conscious level:
Psychological adjustment exists when the concept 
of the self is such that all the sensory and visceral 
experiences of the organism are, or may be, assimilated
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on a symbolic level into a consistent relationship 
with the concept of the self (1950, p. 510).
Reductions in the magnitude of the conscious field 
reduce its regulatory effectiveness, with consequent reduc­
tions in flexibility and in the chances that the behavior 
will be of long-term, benefit to the individual.
Intimately related to the concept of magnitude in 
Collier’s theory is the concept of stress. Stress is used 
as a broad term, including psychological, physiological, 
and physical factors, all of which have "the common element 
of placing demands on the organism’s capacity to react to a 
degree that usually becomes uncomfortable or threatening" 
(Collier, 1955, p. 271). The way in which an individual 
copes with stress is related to the magnitude of the con­
scious field.
Ego strength, a broad explanatory concept Collier 
uses, is defined as "the ability to accept into awareness 
potentially threatening material and to assimilate it con­
structively" (1955, p. 271). This broad definition sub­
sumes traditional characteristics of ego strength concepts, 
such as orientation, reality testing, and the ability to 
integrate. Sufficient ego strength is represented in the 
intrapersonal freedom and flexibility to cope adequately 
with both internal and external demands in ways which are 
beneficial to the self.
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Self regulation, then, is directly related to ego 
strength. Optimum self regulation is the result of maximal 
ego strength. The individual who must deny from awareness 
stressful or threatening experiences gives a less flexible, 
more segmental response to the given situation. As Collier 
says.
To whatever extent the individual has denied . . .
his feelings, anxieties, dreads, elations, to that 
extent he has become a more rigidly organized individ­
ual with fewer chances for these feelings to become 
flexibly related to other areas of his personality
(1955, p. 270).
Those individuals who lack the internal freedom and 
flexibility (or ego strength) to deal directly and accept- 
ingly with particular issues--internal or external--must 
employ defensive operations to cope with the threat of the 
situation. Collier uses the term "defense system," avoid­
ing the old term "mechanism," which is described as a psy­
chological reaction, "protective in nature, which either 
increases the psychological distance of the threatening 
object or whatever, or disguises or distorts the threat so 
that in its new form it becomes more acceptable" (1956, 
p. 362). When the individual's "tolerance threshold" is 
exceeded in encountering stress, the defense system is ac­
tivated. Tolerance for stress is immediately related to 
ego strength; the greater the ego strength, the higher the 
tolerance threshold, the less need for defense system opera­
tions. The terms used here are obviously inter-related, and
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the definitions involve a great degree of circularity.
In one way or another the defense system generally 
serves to decrease the permeability of the conscious field. 
Permeability refers to the degree to which one can accept 
into the conscious field "segments of experience, past or 
current, which are related to processes operating at any 
given time" (Collier, 1956, p. 362).
A distinction must be made between the concepts of 
permeability and ego strength. While one significant aspect 
of ego strength is the permeability of the barriers to the 
conscious field, ego strength also refers to the ability to 
assimilate constructively that which is in awareness. This 
refers to the organizing, integrating, and regulating activ­
ities of ego functioning. The defense system of the indi­
vidual ordinarily operates to keep from consciousness that 
which is too threatening or too painful for the individual 
to tolerate; however, one's defenses are not consistently 
effective in doing so. At times consciousness might be 
flooded with overwhelming and exceedingly stressful mate­
rial which the individual cannot handle effectively or con­
structively. This failure of regulatory devices is frequent­
ly seen in extreme emotional instability--among psychotics, 
for instance--when the ego processes are so weakened that 
strong defenses cannot be maintained. Thus there might re­
sult extreme permeability without ego strength, which amounts 
to a failure of the regulatory aspects of consciousness.
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Collier (1957b) discusses this distinction with reference 
to some of the inherent dangers in the use of the free 
association technique with severely disturbed individuals.
In his elaboration of primary and secondary defenses, 
Collier (1956) presents a differentiation which is closely 
synonymous to the "mechanisms of defense" in analytic theory, 
especially as developed in the works of Anna Preud (19^6).
The chief difference is, of course, the use of Collier's 
own concepts in re-examining the mechanisms. Primary de­
fense operations (denial, repression) are a constriction of 
the field of consciousness--a selective "shutting-out" of 
tension-producing experiences. The lower one's tolerance 
threshold, the more active are the primary defense opera­
tions. Collier writes:
When stress rises above the threshold of tolera­
tion, and is either persistent or increases in inten­
sity, the continued utilization of primary defense 
exacts a price which is paid in terms of reduced 
effectiveness of regulation. That is to say, the 
degree of dominance of the conscious field is de­
pendent upon the degree to which experience relevant 
to the needs of the moment is available. It fol­
lows, therefore, that whenever the primary defense 
is used, some degree of crippling of the regulatory 
function of the conscious field results (1956,
p. 363).
In extreme uses of primary defenses, when the adap­
tive regulatory field becomes so "impoverished, inadequate 
or impotent, serious disorganization in thought, feeling 
and behavior occurs" (Collier, 1956, p. 363)• Collier's 
consideration of primary defenses is akin to Anna Freud's
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comment on repression:
But repression is not only the most efficacious, 
it is also the most dangerous mechanism. The dis­
sociation from whole tracts of instinctual and af­
fective life may destroy the integrity of the per­
sonality for good and all (19^6, p. 5^)•
Secondary defenses, as in analytic theory, are 
those operations other than repression and denial, such as 
rationalization or compensatory devices, which "cushion the 
threats of additional stress" (Collier, 1956, p. 365). The 
operation of secondary defenses, while perhaps having a dis­
torting effect, does not increase the constriction of the 
conscious field, rather it aids in maintaining a status quo 
of constriction. Secondary defenses reduce the need of the 
individual to "leave the field."
To Collier (1957a, 1957b) psychotherapy is a process 
by which self regulation is restored or improved by provid­
ing the circumstances and experiences which tend to increase 
one’s ego strength, allowing a more flexible and effective 
personality. The purpose of the interpersonal communication 
("the relationship") of psychotherapy is to facilitate a 
more adequate degree of intrapersonal communication. Collier 
says, "What one can talk about indicates what he can at least 
begin to accept, and what one can accept indicates what he 
can begin to manage" (1957b, p. 279).
In his most recent article. Collier (1957b) develops 
more comprehensively his theory of psychotherapy, applying 
the concepts of stress, ego strength, and self regulation to
lé
the therapeutic process. In his formulation there are some 
obvious similarities to the theory of Rogers (1950), par­
ticularly such concepts as the "drive for self improvement," 
"self concept," and "ideal self." Collier states that when 
stress is reduced to a level below the threshold of toler­
ance, the individual is free to act in ways which will facil­
itate self improvement. The drive for self improvement is 
obscured and fettered when the individual is not able to 
perceive within awareness his own feelings and thoughts.
As part of his theory of psychotherapy, the drive 
for self improvement becomes an important and basic con­
cept. It is thought of in two aspects. The first involves 
the amount of difference the individual perceives between 
himself and the person he would like to be (the "ego ideal" 
of Horney, the "ideal self" of Rogers). The second aspect 
involves the extent to which this desire "to be" or "to be­
come" is translated into realistic action relevant to his 
goals. The more nearly free, the less rigid the individual 
is, the greater become his chances of putting his desires 
into realistic action.
Since stress beyond certain tolerance limits can 
cause a defensive exclusion of relevant thoughts and feel­
ings, it is essential in the therapeutic process that the 
stress which is encountered be within the toleration of the 
patient or client. The importance which Collier places on 
the effect of stress in the interpersonal communication
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of psychotherapy is closely related to the way in which 
Sullivan (1952) talks of anxiety as the chief handicap to 
communication in the therapeutic process. "Selective in­
attention," in Sullivan’s language, is closely related to 
"distortions of the conscious field,” in Collier’s language. 
When the therapist is able to reduce the stress or anxiety 
to an appropriate "working level," the patient or client is 
more capable of dealing constructively with his own thoughts 
and feelings.
Free Association from the Standpoint 
of Collier’s Theorv
In the light of his theory. Collier (1957b) presents 
some basic problems in the use of free association. One 
such problem has been observed by many therapists, and it 
poses an interesting paradox. That is, when a person comes 
into psychotherapy he is initially unable to free associate 
in a free and spontaneous way, and it is only after he has 
developed increased freedom and security in the situation 
and within himself that he is able to do so. In Collier’s 
terms, he is unable to free associate because of the rigid­
ity and constriction of the conscious field, and the stress 
which is perceived in the instructions to free associate 
either adds to the constriction or, in the least, promotes 
the continuance of the status quo of constriction by acti­
vating secondary defense operations.
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It would seem that the individual who is most secure, 
who would have the highest tolerance threshold for stress, 
is the individual who could most effectively free associate. 
Here free association has a broader meaning than merely the 
naming of words as they come to mind. It suggests, at its 
freest, total expression by both verbal and non-verbal means 
of whatever is being experienced at any particular moment: 
the affect, the ideas, the memories, etc. Such expression 
is probably not achieved until an individual has very nearly 
reached successful completion of intensive psychotherapy.
In such free expression, there is both great permeability 
of the conscious field as well as increased tolerance for 
the stress which such expression customarily gives rise to. 
That is, the ability to free associate is directly related 
to ego strength. Therefore, those individuals who would 
demonstrate the greatest ability to free associate have no 
need for psychotherapy, while those who find psychotherapy 
necessary are those who find it most difficult to free asso­
ciate .
Individuals who are so insecure as to come for psy­
chotherapy are unable to comply with the directions to free 
associate because of a basic inability to range far and wide 
in consciously exploring their feelings, values, needs, and 
the like. It is not only a formidable task for the emotion­
ally insecure, it is a demand with which they cannot readily 
comply for the very reasons that they are in psychotherapy.
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One of the best criteria of improvement in therapy is this 
ability to expand one's conscious experiences and to express 
"what is going on“ in one's consciousness.
Free association involves two processes. First, the 
conscious experiencing of one's self, and, second, the ex­
pression of the conscious experience by verbal and other 
means. It is assumed that the individual who is most able 
to accept his experiences into awareness has the greatest 
ability to express them, verbally or otherwise, in meeting 
the demands of any situation. An individual has difficulty 
with the expression of feelings as a consequence of his dif­
ficulty in consciously experiencing his feelings. "The more 
consciousness of one's self one has, the more spontaneous 
and free he can be" (May, 1953j p. 104).
liThen external structure is removed or markedly re­
duced, as in psychotherapy, the individual must rely upon 
his own self in responding to the situation. To the inse­
cure individual, the stress which is encountered as a result 
of this necessity of self-reliance is frequently such that 
he "freezes up." His responses are rigid, barren or inap­
propriate, because he lacks the freedom to accept himself in 
"deeper, more meaningful ways."
Of course, the conscious field is made up of a 
myriad of interacting and mutually modifying factors, and 
verbalizing what is in the conscious field at any particular 
moment is an impossibility, not only because of the dynamic.
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constantly changing nature of the field, but because the 
field is continually modified by expression. Nevertheless, 
it would seem that free association, at its freest, is the 
nearest one comes to expressing what is going on in the 
changing conscious field. A person is able to associate 
freely only when he is able to allow great permeability of 
the conscious field, permitting thoughts and feelings to 
come into consciousness freely. The rigid, constricted 
person, because of his need for defensive operations, not 
only is guarded against the intrusion of threatening ideas 
and associations, but he also erects barricades which might 
hamper the flow of all ideas and associations. Overintel- 
lectualization and externalization are frequent secondary 
defense operations, and not infrequently the rigid person 
on being asked to free associate draws "a complete blank" 
and complains that "nothing is there."
The neurotic individual is on guard against certain 
ideas and feelings originating within him because of his in­
ability to accept and deal with them constructively. Self 
regulation is hampered because only a limited portion of 
one’s experience is available; free associations are re­
stricted because the intrapersonal freedom demanded is lack­
ing. Doubtless, many--if not most--of the hours spent in 
the therapeutic process are taken up with what proves to be 
superficial content which the individual brings into the 
conscious field as a means of restricting other, more
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threatening material. "Working through the resistance" can 
be seen as the process of creating a higher threshold of 
tolerance so that the individual can begin to accept more 
threatening material into awareness.
Free association, as a therapeutic technique, is 
not and was not intended to be a verbal confessional, a mere 
talking out of one's problems. As Fromm has stated:
Freud's discovery of free association had the aim 
of finding out what went on underneath the surface, 
of discovering who you really were. The modern talk­
ing to the sympathetic listener has the opposite, 
although unavowed aim; its function is to make a man 
forget who he is . . .  to lose all tensions, and with 
it all sense of self {1955} p. l68).
The mere telling someone else one's own problems has 
become an accepted way of "getting things off your chest."
It is free talk. It is a partial release from the stored-
up feelings one has, but rarely does it permit the full ac­
ceptance of the feelings into consciousness. Again, as 
Fromm has pointed out:
One speaks about the tragic occurrences of one's 
life with the same ease as one would talk about an­
other person of no particular interest, or as one
would speak about the various troubles one has had
with one's car (1955? p. 169).
Following from what has been said, mere verbalized 
words from a quantitative point of view is hardly a measure 
of an individual's intrapersonal freedom. Some individuals 
are capable of rambling on almost endlessly in a highly in- 
tellectualized way, while the feeling component of the con­
tent seems absent. Collier (1956) points out--as did
22
Freud (1938)--that the painful affect associated with cer­
tain ideas or past experiences may remain repressed while 
the intellectual content is verbally expressed. Certain 
individuals in the process of therapy have the sound of 
"recording machines" or "hollow men" as they express words 
void of feeling and personal involvement. This, then, is 
not free association in the full sense of the term. Rather 
this is a controlled or constricted association, in which 
thoughts are organized and "filtered." It is sometimes ob­
served that "free association" of this sort is used as a 
defense, keeping the more threatening material out of the 
conscious field.
One of the significant aspects of free association 
is that the process involves that which is intensely person­
al: one’s personal thoughts, ideas, attitudes, feelings,
etc. The social situations of our culture customarily 
throughout one’s life inhibit much complete personal ex­
pression. One becomes aware of protocol and rules of 
"polite society." Very early one learns not to think cer­
tain things, much less to verbalize them. Thoughts become 
dichotomized into "good" and "bad," "right" and "wrong," 
which brings about an imposed constriction of the conscious 
field. Reik has said:
Is it not easy simply to tell what occurs to you? 
Should it not be very easy to speak without order and 
logical connection, to say everything that flashes 
through your mind without rhyme or reason? No, it 
is rather difficult; it is more like a steeplechase
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than a flat course. Every minute a new obstacle 
blocks your way. You will be surprised by the kinds 
of thoughts that occur to you. You will not only be 
surprised; you will be ashamed and sometimes even 
afraid of them. More than the conventions of soci­
ety have to be thrown overboard. Fear and shame, 
which is perhaps a special kind of fear itself, have 
to be discarded . . . mean, aggressive, and hostile 
tendencies--especially against persons near and dear 
to us--are difficult to admit (1952, p. 25).
The more secure person, the person Maslow (195^) character­
izes as having escaped the "sick provoking" aspects of the 
culture, accepts more fully his individuality and has 
greater "degrees of freedom" in responding to the directions 
to free associate. The insecure person, being more con­
stricted and less flexible, is more rigidly bound to a 
narrow and perhaps even barren field of consciousness.
The stress which is created by the directions to 
free associate, as perceived by insecure individuals, is 
too frequently great enough to preclude the full awareness 
of feelings and thoughts; and without the security which 
comes from the relationship between the therapist and 
client, the material produced by the client would probably 
not deviate from the rather ineffectual saying of words.
In the process of therapy, the therapeutic relationship 
serves to lower the stressfulness of the situation and to 
promote increased permeability of consciousness and the 
ultimate establishment of more effective self regulation.
While free association has long been used as a basic 
technique in psychotherapy, it has been used only sparingly
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as a research technique. Murray (1938) used free association 
as a technique in his studies of personality. Earlier Hull 
and Lugoff (1921) made an extensive investigation of what 
was termed "free association” with the Jung Word Association 
Test, in which they studied the differential associations 
and reactions of subjects to the standard word list. Word 
and chain associations have been studied by many psycholo­
gists, including Kent and Rosanoff (1938), Rapaport (19^6), 
Jung (1910), Wolff (1950), and Shafer (Rapaport, ipkS). 
Temerlin (1956) studied the differential ability to free 
associate among psychotherapy clients. But by and large 
most of the literature concerned with free association is 
of a non-experimental variety, coming from the various 
psychoanalytic writings, in which free association is used 
more or less informally as an experimental variable.
If one is to use free association as an experimental 
variable, it must have some definite, observable character­
istics. Before one can say what is free association and 
what is not, the term must be defined more explicitly than 
by merely saying that free association is saying whatever 
comes to one's mind. The characteristics of free associa­
tion as a therapeutic technique must be defined if they are 
to be measured. From the standpoint of Collier's regula­
tory field theory, the characteristics of free association 
may be viewed in the following way, using three descriptive 
concepts :
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Spontaneity results from a lack of constriction in 
the conscious field and refers to the individual’s ability 
to express freely and directly ideas, feelings, memories, 
etc. The individual who cannot consciously perceive such 
phenomena cannot be spontaneous and free. When there is 
limited permeability of the conscious field, there is a 
consequent rigidity in expression. The so-called "obses­
sional neurotic" is characterized as a person whose conscious 
experience must be orderly and, at least superficially, 
plausible. His relationships with others are characterized 
by rigidity and what Sullivan (1952) has called "stickiness."
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And, what is most significant here, spontaneity is all but 
missing. In free associating, if it can be called that, the 
obsessional neurotic might weave intricate verbal patterns 
in ways which are void of feeling and generally character­
ized by a dry, thought-out organization, the control squelch­
ing spontaneity. The boundaries of the conscious field are 
maintained as a rigid, stubborn defense against the free 
flow of ideas and feelings into awareness.
In spontaneous expression both affective and verbal 
content are unrestricted. Material is brought into the 
conscious field and expressed freely and openly without re­
gard for meaning, logic, organization, etc. The individual 
responds with immediacy and with directness, with verbal 
facility being a relatively unimportant aspect of the pro­
cess. Intellectualization demands the filtering, organizing,
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restraining qualities which spontaneity precludes. Spon­
taneity, like impulsivity, has more to do with affective 
processes than intellectual ones. It is the freedom one 
has in expressing feeling that permits him freedom in ex­
pressing ideas.
As a second characteristic of free association, 
tolerance may be described as the individual's ability to 
cope with the stress of the situation without the need for 
situational defense operations or active resistance. The 
defense system is manifested in various and sundry maneu­
vers, all of which seem designed to prevent the individual 
from becoming aware of his own feelings and thoughts direct­
ly. While in many respects tolerance is closely related to 
spontaneity, a differentiation is necessary. For instance, 
an individual may seem to be spontaneous enough in express­
ing, say, hostility toward his therapist, particularly when 
he has learned that this is acceptable behavior, because by 
doing this he can maintain an external anchorage and can 
prevent the discovery and handling of more stressful mate­
rial. That the therapist is making undue demands, or that 
he is a charlatan robbing people of their hard earned money, 
or that he just basically does not know what he is doing may 
all be spontaneous protests used by the client which might 
be interpreted as means of resisting or defending against 
the threat of continued self-exploration.
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Tolerance, then, is defined here as the ability to 
comply with the directions to free associate without the 
need of such defense system operations as rationalization, 
qualification, side-stepping, or maneuvers which would pre­
vent the individual from doing what is asked of him. Toler­
ance is present when the stress of the situation is such 
that the defense system is not activated. The individual 
is honest with himself and copes directly with the demands 
of the situation. To be able to do this presupposes more 
ego strength than one would expect a client to possess in 
the initial stages of the therapeutic process. As Monroe 
says, rephrasing a statement of Fenichel, "The ego must be 
educated to tolerate less and less distorted derivatives" 
(1955} p.. 301). In "working through" the resistance, the 
client gains greater tolerance through the strengthening 
therapeutic relationship. Defensive behavior declines with 
the strengthening of the ego.
A third characteristic of free association, vari- 
abilitv, is used here to refer to freedom and flexibility 
in content. As one gains the freedom of association, ideas 
which are seemingly unconnected and only fortuitously related 
are linked together and in turn give rise to new material.
The individual rigidly bound to the same content is probably 
one who has found safe or neutral territory and is not able 
to gamble on allowing new ideas or feelings to come into 
the conscious field.
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In Freud's (1959) original directions to his analy- 
sands--with the simile of the person describing the scenery 
from the window of a moving train--the emphasis was placed 
upon the constantly changing nature of the individual's 
thoughts. Some are prone to "work to death" certain ideas 
or past experiences from a very narrow vantage point, others 
rely upon stereotyped ideas and expressions, while others 
are repetitious and tied to psychodynamic terminology. And 
all of these behaviors ward off the intrusion of more 
threatening experiences into awareness.
Variability is related to Collier's term flexibil­
ity, in that flexibility as a personality attribute of the 
individual is a precondition for the variability of free 
association. The rigidly organized person, the person 
within whom the conscious field is constricted and rela­
tively impermeable, has a limited field from which to draw 
his experience in free association.
These three descriptive terms--spontaneity, toler­
ance, and variability--while by no means completing the 
picture of free association, are used here as the central 
attributes of free association. They, from the writer's 
point of view, seem to be directly related to the most 




Collier’s theory of consciousness as a regulatory 
field generates several hypotheses concerning free associa­
tion behavior in the therapeutic process. It is the purpose 
of this study to test several hypotheses, derived from Col­
lier’s theory, pertaining to the differential reactions of 
secure and insecure individuals in free association situa­
tions .
Security and insecurity, for the purpose of this 
study, will be determined by test scores on the Maslow 
Security-Insecurity Inventory and a modified form of the 
narrower Multiple Choice Rorschach Test. These tests will 
be used to select two experimental groups, a group of secure 
individuals and a group of insecure individuals. Security 
and insecurity are defined on pages 33 and 3^.
In studying the differential reactions to free asso­
ciation, two experimental tasks will be utilized. The first 
task will utilize a chain association test consisting of 
twenty stimulus words, taken from the Jung Word Association 
Test. Ten of the words are the ones which have been found
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to elicit the least emotional response, and the other 10 
are those which have been found to elicit the greatest emo­
tional response of the 100-word test. For the purpose of 
this study, these words are referred to as non-stress words 
and stress words, respectively. Subjects' performances on 
the chain association test will be evaluated in terms of 
the numbers of verbal associations to each word.
On the basis of Collier's theory it would be pre­
dicted that emotionally secure individuals would produce 
more associations to the stimulus words than insecure in­
dividuals because experiences are more readily available 
to the conscious field. Also, since stress serves to con­
strict the conscious field, both the secure and insecure 
individuals should give fewer associations to stress words 
than to non-stress words. Since the secure individuals are 
seen as having a higher tolerance for stress, they should 
show less decrease than the insecure individuals in the num­
ber of associations to stress words relative to the number 
of associations to non-stress words. That is, the insecure 
individuals should be more greatly affected by stress.
The second experimental task will consist of a free 
association period, during which the subject will be asked 
to talk about himself and will be given directions similar 
to therapeutic directions to free associate. This period 
will be tape recorded and evaluated by three clinical judges 
in terms of the three attributes--spontaneity, tolerance.
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and variability--discussed in the previous chapter. The 
scales used for this evaluation appear on pages and 42. 
It would be predicted on the basis of Collier’s theory that 
the secure individuals will be freer, less defensive, and 
more variable in responding to the free association task 
than the insecure individuals.
Evbotheses
Specifically the hypotheses which are to be tested 
are as follows:
In their performances on a word chain association 
test, consisting of stress and non-stress words:
1. Secure individuals will differ from insecure 
individuals in that the former will produce a greater num­
ber of responses.
2. Both secure and insecure individuals will show 
a greater number of responses to non-stress words than to 
stress words.
3. Secure individuals will differ from insecure 
individuals in that the former will show less decrease in 
number of responses to stress words relative to the number 
of responses to non-stress words.
In a free association situation analogous to the 
therapeutic situation, secure individuals will show, as 
evaluated by clinical judges:
4. A greater degree of spontaneity.
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5. Greater tolerance for the demands of the situa­
tion.




Two hundred and ninety-eight male college students, 
all of whom were enrolled in a course in introductory psy­
chology at the University of Oklahoma, were administered a 
battery of tests consisting of the Maslow Security-Insecurity 
Inventory and a modified form of the narrower Multiple Choice 
Rorschach Test. The purpose of the testing was to select 
from the group of 298 two groups of subjects who could be 
defined as "secure” and "insecure."
In general, the term "security" is a broad generic 
term which includes those characteristics which permit an 
individual to function effectively and productively in the 
various aspects and roles of his life. Security is almost 
synonymous with "mental health" (Maslow, 1952) . The secure 
individual copes effectively and harmoniously in interper­
sonal relationships, he has a high tolerance for anxiety, 
and he is "on good terms" with the world. He has no morbid 
fear of being the individual that he is, and he characteris­
tically reacts in ways which are in the long run beneficial
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to himself. Maslow”s (1952, pp. 1-2) definitions of the 
terms "secure" and "insecure" are paraphrased below:
Insecurity. This individual perceives the world 
as a dangerous, threatening and hostile place. He 
sees human beings as essentially bad, evil, or self­
ish. He experiences a general pessimism and has a 
tendency to be unhappy or discontented. He experi­
ences an acute consciousness of himself and feels 
isolated, alone, and left out. He shows poor con­
trol over his feelings and shows manifestations of 
tension, i.e., "nervousness," fatigue, dysphoria, 
irritability, etc. He seems selfish, ego-centric 
defensive; has feelings of guilt and shame. He has 
false goals and inappropriate strivings.
Security. This individual perceives the world 
and life as pleasant, warm, and friendly. He feels 
that he has a place in the group, that he is accept­
ed, liked, loved. He has little hostility and has 
easy affection for others. He has a tendency to ex­
pect good to happen, a general optimism, and he is 
calm, at ease, relaxed. He shows effective control 
over his feelings but is able to be outgoing. He 
shows emotional stability, a lack of anxiety, and a 
tendency toward being world- or problem-centered, 
rather than self-centered. He has realistic coping 
systems, well-based self-esteem, self acceptance.
The Security-Insecurity Inventory, hereafter re­
ferred to as the S-I, was used as a measure of security.
The 5-1 has the characteristic limitation of personality 
questionnaires, since the subject reports only what he wants 
to, and there is no assurance that he can or will give an 
accurate picture of himself. It was believed that those 
who scored lowest in security, in comparison with the group, 
were most probably insecure but that those who scored high­
est in security might not necessarily be secure individuals. 
This belief is in keeping with the advice of Maslow (1952) 
who says that the S-I is best used to screen out those
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lacking in security. He cautions that a person may or may 
not choose to tell the truth and, even when one is conscious­
ly honest, he may be lacking in self-knowledge. Additional 
checks seemed necessary in the selection of subjects, par­
ticularly in the case of those who scored as secure individ­
uals.
The S-I is composed of 75 statements, each of which 
is answered "Yes" or "No" by the subject. In about 50 per 
cent of the cases a "Yes" answer gives a weight of one to­
wards security, and in the remaining cases a "No" answer 
gives a weight of one towards security. A copy of the S-I 
items appears as Appendix A.
These results were used together with the results 
from the modified form of the Multiple Choice Rorschach 
Test, hereafter referred to as the MCR. This test was used 
as a way of gathering projective data to use supplementary 
to the S-I. In order to provide the means by which a great 
number of Rorschach protocols could be evaluated, a modifi­
cation of narrower's group technique was used. On the con­
ventional MCR test, the subject is asked to select one of 
ten listed responses by underlining the one he thinks is 
the best description of the card. There are three such 
lists for each card. Thus the subject gives a total of 30 
responses for the 10 Rorschach cards. Through extensive 
research, narrower (1951) has standardized the responses as 
being "good" or "poor" in terms of general emotional
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stability. For the purpose of this study, the number of 
items in each multiple choice grouping was reduced to five-- 
two "good" answers, two "poor" answers, and one "half poor" 
answer selected for each grouping of five. The "half poor" 
items are items which narrower has found to be statistically 
less significant as indications of maladjustment than the 
"poor" items; therefore, these items were given a weight of 
-.5 , while the "good" items received a weight of 1 and the 
"poor" items a weight of -1. A copy of this modified form 
of the MCR appears as Appendix B.
It was assumed that this reduction of the choices 
from ten to five would have no measurable effect on the re­
sults except that it would msike it impossible to score the 
records in terms of the conventional scoring categories.
The reduction of choices permitted the use of standard IBM 
answer sheets and machine scoring in obtaining the results.
narrower’s (1951) research, which has involved over 
50,000 test records, has shown that in about 80 per cent of
the cases, subjects with no "poor" responses were indepen­
dently evaluated as emotionally stable individuals, while 
those having as many as six "poor" responses were in all 
cases found to have "emotional difficulty." Therefore, as 
a "screening device," the MCR seems to be a very effective 
instrument.
Each Rorschach card was presented on a screen by
use of a projector, and the subject read the choices of
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answers from an individual test booklet and marked his 
choices on an IBM answer sheet, marking three answers for 
each card. The answer sheets were scored using three 
separate keys for the three different weights of 1, -1, 
and -.5. A total score was obtained for each subject and 
ranked, with the highest percentage of good answers being 
given a rank of 1, and the lowest percentage of good an­
swers a rank of 298.
Tentative choice of subjects was made by using the 
results of the two tests. To be selected as a subject for 
the secure group, an individual had to fall within the top 
15 per cent of the tested population on the MCR and have a 
score in the "secure” range when compared with Maslow’s 
norms on the S-I. To be selected as an insecure subject, 
an individual had to score within the bottom 15 per cent 
on the MCR and fall within the "insecure" range on Maslow’s 
norms for the S-I.
Because over-all verbal ability might well be a 
factor in the performance of the experimental task, subjects 
were matched on the basis of their total performance on the 
Ohio State Psychological Examination, Form 23 (OSPE). The 
matching was done through the use of decile groupings of 
OSPE total scores, the following groupings being used;
9-10 deciles--High Verbal Ability
7-8 deciles--Above Average Verbal Ability
5-6 deciles--Average Verbal Ability
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3-4 deciles--Below Average Verbal Ability
1-2 deciles--Low Verbal Ability
OSPE scores on all subjects were available, since 
this test is used as one of the University of Oklahoma 
placement tests. Final selection of subjects was achieved 
by matching the two tentative experimental groups on the 
basis of the OSPE decile groupings.
From this point, all subjects were handled in a like 
manner. Individual appointments were arranged with each 
subject, who had volunteered his time with the incentive 
of being given grade credit in the course for his partici­
pation. None of the subjects had ever had any experience 
with psychotherapy, and each was naive as to the purpose 
of the experiment.
Procedure
When the subject arrived for his appointment, he was 
shown into a room which contained an arm chair, a tape re­
corder, a desk, and a swivel chair. He was seated in the 
arm chair facing the desk, and he was then given the follow­
ing preliminary directions:
This experiment has to do with the thought associa­
tions of people. It is an area which psychologists do 
not know a great deal about, and we feel that this 
study is a very important one. There are many people, 
like yourself, taking part in this experiment and we 
are more interested in the total group results than 
we are in any one individual's results. What we do 
here will become a part of the group information and 
will no longer be associated with you as an individ­
ual; nevertheless, let me assure you that whatever
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goes on here will be held in strict confidence.
Perhaps you have heard of what is called "free 
association." This involves a person saying what­
ever thoughts come to his mind, as they occur to 
him, without making any attempt to organize or order 
them or to omit any thoughts which might seem silly 
or clever, conventional or indecent, important or 
trivial; and without aim, order, or any apparent 
connections between thoughts.
Now, first of all, I am going to read a list of 
words to you. After hearing each word, I would like 
for you to say the first word that comes to your 
mind--but don't stop there. Other words will occur 
to you, and I would like for you to say aloud all 
such words as they occur to you, whether they have 
any apparent relation with the first word. There 
are no right or wrong, no good or bad responses.
Just say whatever comes to your mind. Now, before 
we start, I would like to turn your chair around a 
little, so that you can lean back and relax. Re­
member that as soon as you hear the first word, tell 
me whatever words occur to you as quickly as you 
can, until I call time.
The following list of words was then presented to 
the subject as Task I of the experiment. A thirty second 
association period was allowed for each word. The words 
were printed on index cards, which were shuffled before 
each presentation to assure a random presentation.
1. Tree 11. Beat
2. Sleep 12. Sin
3. Month 13. Prick4. Paint Ik, Marry
5. Rich 15. Angry
6. Sing 16. Nice
7. Swim 17. Abuse
8. Head 18. Sorrow
9. Hay 19. Fear
10. Stork 20. Kiss
The twenty words which composed the chain associa­
tion test were taken from the Jung Word Association Test.
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Those numbered. 1 through 10 were those which have been found 
to elicit the least emotional responses, and those numbered 
11 through 20 have been found to elicit the most emotional 
responses of the 100-word association test. The words 11 
through 20 were selected as words which would increase the 
stress of the association process since they call up more 
personalized and emotional responses than do the more nearly 
neutral words numbered 1 through 10. This distinction be­
tween the two lists of words seemed justified on the basis 
of the empirical findings of Hull and Lugoff (l92l), as 
well as on the basis of Jung's (1910) clinical observations.
Following the administration of the chain associa­
tion test, the subjects were given the following instruc­
tions;
Now I would like for you to do something a little 
different. During the next few minutes--and I will 
tell you when to start and when to stop--I would like 
for you to talk about yourself. Once you have 
started, say everything that occurs to you, no matter 
what it is. Those things which occur to you might 
seem irrelevant, embarrassing, or even funny, but 
please go ahead and say them anyway. Act as though 
you are trying to say as much as it is possible to 
say within the few minutes you have. Where you be­
gin and what you say is entirely up to you. You 
may begin.
After a five-minute period, the subject was told to 
stop. He was asked not to discuss the experimental proce­
dure with any of his classmates. The entire experimental 
procedure was electrically recorded on tape.
The tape recordings of the free association period 
(Task II) were presented to three clinical judges who were
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asked to make independent judgments. Each judge was a 
clinical psychologist, with a Ph.D. and several years of 
experience. The three judges were professional associates 
with similar orientations toward personality and psycho­
therapy. Each had received his training in the same clini­
cal program and had acquired several years of experience as 
a psychotherapist.
The judges were not aware of the group, secure or 
insecure, to which the subject had been assigned. In each 
case the judge was asked to listen to the recording and 
then rate the performance of each subject on the following 
scales :
1. Constraint-Spontaneity
Subject appears to be 
hesitant and constrained. 
Thinks out and is con­
cerned with the logical 
organization as well as 
the content of what he 
says. Blocks frequently.
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Subject appears to respond 
openly and freely, without 
regard for logical organi­
zation. Does not appear 




Subject appears to ration­
alize, explain, or overin- 
tellectualize his respon­
ses; to question the task 
or to employ defensive 
maneuvers to avoid comply­
ing with the instructions. 
Depersonalizes his re­
sponses; avoids expressing 
feelings and attitudes.
8
Subject appears to be 
direct and compliant, 
showing no efforts to 
avoid the task, and copes 
with the situation direct­





Content of subject's re­
sponses is stereotyped 
and cliched; narrow and 
constricted; lacking in 
freedom of association; 
tied to biographical 
"facts."
Content of subject's re­
sponses shows great free­
dom and variability, with 
wide range of content.
Each of the scales was further defined for the
judges for the purpose of the study in the following ways:
A. Spontaneity. Subject responds without con­
straint and in a way which expresses his feelings of 
the moment. He is not concerned with logical organi­
zation or intellectual continuity. He does not ap­
pear to think through his thoughts or associations, 
but expresses them as they occur to him. He is un­
inhibited and uncritical of his associations; does 
not appear to avoid or filter potentially stressful 
material. "Blocking" is seen as the absence of 
spontaneity.
B. Defensiveness (lack of tolerance). Subject 
attempts to distort or to react to the task in such 
a way that he avoids reacting directly to the de­
mands of the situation, guarding his individuality. 
While the absence of spontaneity might also be seen 
as defensiveness, defensiveness here suggests a 
more "active" resistance: ridiculing the task,
glibly intellectualizing responses, rationalizing 
responses, asking questions, etc.
C. Variability. This term refers to the content 
of subject's responses. Subject expresses a wide 
variety of content and does not seem tied to stereo­
typed, cliched, or perseverative reactions. The 
content seems to come from a freedom of association, 
allowing one idea to lead to another, without being 
confined to a narrow or controlled range.
Treatment of the Data
In analyzing the data from Task I, the chain associ­
ation task, it was necessary to test the following differ­
ences ;
1. The difference between the number of responses 
given by the Secure Group and the number given by the In­
secure Group to both stress and non-stress words.
2. The difference between the number of responses 
given by both Secure and Insecure Groups to non-stress words 
and the number given to stress words.
3. The difference between the two groups with re­
gard to the amount of decrease in responses from the non­
stress task to the stress task.
These differences were analyzed by a repeated 
measurements design analysis of variance. The .05 level 
of confidence was used to accept or reject the hypotheses.
In analyzing the data from Task II, the free associ­
ation task, it was first necessary to demonstrate that the 
mean judges’ rating for each subject was a meaningful measure 
of performance. This was accomplished by correlating the 
ratings of each judge with the ratings of the other two 
judges for all three scales (Spontaneity, Tolerance, and 
Variability), using the product moment method.
Mean judges’ ratings were used in determining the 
significance of the differences between the Secure Group 
and the Insecure Group in terms of spontaneity, tolerance.
and variability on the free association task. Analysis of 
variance was used to test the differences.
CHAPTER IV
RESULTS
The results of the screening tests, the MCR and the 
S-I, indicated that 23 of the male students in Introductory 
Psychology had met the criteria for the Secure Group and 26 
had met the criteria for the Insecure Group. The final 
selection of subjects was made on the basis of the total 
decile score on the OSPE. The distributions of OSPE scores 
for the preliminary groups are shown in Table 1, arranged 
by decile groupings.
Table 1
Distribution of OSPE Decile Scores of 
Preliminary Experimental Groups








Final selection of subjects was achieved by match­
ing the number of subjects in the Secure and Insecure Group 
within each decile grouping. This matching reduced the 
number of subjects in each group to 21. Table 2 shows the 
final distribution of subjects in comparison with the dis­
tribution required for perfect representation of the popu­
lation from which the subjects were drawn.
Table 2
A Comparison of the Number of Subjects Within Each 









9-10 4 3.58 or 4
7-8 6 4.89 or 5
5-6 4 5.33 or 5
3-4 4 4.28 or 4
1-2 3 2.88 or 3
As shown in Table 2, there are two instances in 
which the number of subjects within a decile grouping de­
parts from the ideal. At the level of Above Average Verbal 
Ability (7-8), there is one subject per group more than the 
ideal number ; and at the Average Verbal Ability level (5-6), 
there is one less subject per group than the ideal number.
In general, then, the experimental groups appear to be 
quite representative with respect to verbal ability.
4?
Other characteristics of the experimental groups are 
presented in Table 3» which compares the groups with respect 
to scores made on the screening tests and age.
Table 3
Comparison of Secure and Insecure Groups 
on MGR, S-I, and Age
Variable
Secure Insecure
Mean Sigma Range Mean Sigma Range
MCR 21.19 2.56 17 - 28 5.62 5.37 -13 - 14
S-I 64.55 3.56 60 - 71 33.76 6.4o 20 - 44
Age 19.4? 1.74 17 - 25 19.05 1.81 17 - 26
The differences between the means of the Secure and 
Insecure Groups on the two screening tests were significant 
beyond the .001 level of confidence using a t^test for 
matched groups. These differences of course would be ex­
pected since each sample represents the extreme end of the 
population distribution.
Task ^
The mean for each group’s performance on the chain 
association test appear in Table 4. The results of the 
analysis of variance used to test the three hypotheses 
appear in Table 5» Individual data from Task I may be 
found in Appendix 0.
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Table 4
Means of the Secure and Insecure Groups 




Non-Stress Words 7.77 5 .65
Stress Words 5.94 4.24
Table 5
Analysis of Variance for the Chain 
Association Test
. Sum of Variance 
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Hypothesis _1_. The first hypothesis stated that 
the Secure Group should show greater productivity on the 
chain association test than the Insecure Group. Table 4 
shows that the means of the Secure Group are greater than 
the means of the Insecure Group, and Table 5 indicates 
that the difference between the two groups is highly 
significant. Therefore, the first hypothesis was sup­
ported.
Hypothesis The second hypothesis stated that
the experimental groups should demonstrate a decrease in 
productivity in responding to stress words relative to 
their productivity in responding to non-stress words.
Table k shows that the subjects produced more associa­
tions to the non-stress words than to the stress words, 
and Table 5 shows this difference to be highly signifi­
cant. Therefore, the second hypothesis was supported.
Hypothesis %. The third hypothesis stated that 
the Secure Group should show less decrease than the Inse­
cure Group in responding to stress words relative to their 
productivity in responding to non-stress words. Table 5 
shows an insignificant interaction, indicating that the 
two groups did not respond differentially to the two types 
of stimulus words. Therefore, the third hypothesis was not 
supported.
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The difference between the mean decrease for the 
Secure Group and the mean decrease for the Insecure Group 
was only .4^, with the Insecure Group showing the smaller 
decrease in terms of actual responses. When viewed in 
terms of the percentage of decrease, the Secure Group had 
a mean decrease of 23.^% and the Insecure Group had a 
mean decrease of 26.8%.
In addition to the data presented here, there were 
salient qualitative differences between the two groups.
The secure subjects appeared to be more personalized in 
their associations and, in general, less restricted by 
the stimulus word in the range of their associations.
The various qualitative differences between the two groups 
are discussed in the following chapter.
Table 6 shows the mean number of associations 
elicited by each stimulus word of the chain association 
test. It is interesting to note that the smallest mean 
number of associations by the Secure Group to the non­
stress words was larger than the largest mean number of 
associations of the Insecure Group to the non-stress words. 
The same is true with regard to the stress words. While 
some of the insecure subjects did produce more responses 
than some of the secure subjects, when the results are 




Mean Number of Associations to Each Stimulus Word 
for the Secure and Insecure Groups




















Angry 6.05 4.33Marry 6.33 4.33Prick 5.95 3.90
Analyses of variance were computed for the purpose 
of analyzing the effects of verbal ability as measured by 
the OSPE, and the results of these analyses showed no sig­
nificant differences on Task I among the various decile 
groupings. The tables for these analyses appear in Ap­
pendix D. Table 7 shows the means for each decile grouping 
for both experimental groups.
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Table 7




1-2 3-4 5-6 7-8 9-10
Non-Stress Words
Secure Group 8.60 7.30 8.42 8.28 6.20
Insecure Group 5.30 5.66 6.17 5.20 5.90
Stress Words
Secure Group 7.70 5.57 5.20 6.35 - 5.70
Insecure Group 4.90 5.05 5.17 4.50 5.27
Task II
In the process of collecting the data for Task II, 
the performances of two subjects were lost because of tech­
nical difficulty with the recording equipment and because 
the quality of the recordings was so poor that the judges 
could not evaluate the performances. Both of the subjects 
were in the Insecure Group. One of the subjects was in 
decile grouping 7-8 on the OSPE, the other in decile group­
ing 3-^. In order to maintain two groups matched on the 
basis of verbal ability, one secure subject was randomly 
eliminated from decile grouping 7-8 and another from group­
ing 3-4. Consequently, judges' ratings were obtained on
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38 subjects, 19 in each group. The distribution of subjects 
on Task II appears in Table 8.
Table 8
A Comparison of the Number of Subjects on Task II 
within Each Decile Grouping with the Number 
Required for Perfect Representation
In Each In Perfectly







With the exception of decile groupings 9-10 and 5-6, 
the number of subjects at each level is what would be ex­
pected on the basis of random sampling. There is one sub­
ject too many in decile grouping 9-10 and one too few in 
grouping 5-6. For the purpose of this study, the represen­
tativeness of the groups seemed acceptable.
Judges' ratings were obtained on the three scales 
(Spontaneity, Tolerance, and Variability), and the results 
of each judge's ratings were correlated with the other two 
judges' ratings by use of the product moment method. These 
correlations appear in Table 9, and the results of the _t 
tests which were computed to test the significance of the 
correlations appear in Appendix E.
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Table 9
Correlations between Judges* Ratings of Seoure and 




Secure Insecure Secure Insecure Secure Insecure
1 and 2 .72 .94 .57 .68 .72 .83
1 and 3 .64 .92 .91 .67 .49 .76
2 and 3 .93 .80 .63 .80 .61 .59
All of the correlations in Table 9 were significant­
ly different from zero beyond the .01 level of confidence 
with the exception of the one between Judges 1 and 2 on the 
Tolerance scale for the Secure Group = .57) and the one 
between Judges 1 and 3 on the Variability scale for the 
Secure Group (r̂  = .49)o Both of these correlations were 
significant beyond the .05 level of confidence. The signifi­
cance of the correlations was such that the use of mean 
judges* ratings in evaluating the results of Task II seemed 
justified.
Total mean judges* ratings for both experimental 
groups appear in Table 10. A complete list of individual 
judges’ ratings of seoure subjects may be found in Appen­
dix F, and ratings of insecure subjects are in Appendix G.
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Table 10
Total Mean Judges* Ratings of Free Association 
Behavior of Secure and Insecure Subjects










Analyses of variance were computed for each of the 
scales, using the F. technique as a test of the significance 
of the difference between the mean ratings of the Secure 
Group and the Insecure Group on the three scales. The 
analyses appear in Tables 11, 12, and 13.
Table 11
Analysis of Variance of the Mean Ratings 
on the Spontaneity Scale
















Analysis of Variance of the Mean Ratings 
on the Tolerance Scale
Source Sum of Squares df Variance Estimate F
Between 26.59 1 26.59 5 .22*
Within 182.66 36 5.07
Total 209.25 37 -
*P = 0O5 .
Table 13
Analysis of Variance of the Mean Ratings 
on the Variability Scale
Source Sum of Squares df Variance Estimate F
Between 43.54 1 43.54 9.85*
Within 158.73 36 4.4l
Total 202.27 37
*T> _ .01.
The differences between the Secure and Insecure 
Groups were significant on all three scales. On the basis 
of these results, it can be said that the Secure subjects 
demonstrated more spontaneity, tolerance, and variability 
in performing the free association task than did the Inse­
cure subjects; therefore, hypotheses k, 5» and 6 were
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supported.
That verbal ability was no significant factor in the 
ratings was demonstrated by the use of analysis of variance 
(see Appendix H ) . The mean judges' ratings listed by OSPE 
decile groups for the Secure and Insecure Groups appear in 
Table 14.
Table l4
Mean Judges' Ratings by OSPE Decile Groupings
OSPE Decile Groupings








































There were several .qualitative differences between 
the Secure and Insecure Groups in their behavior during the 
free association period. These differences are discussed 
in the following chapter. Of particular importance is the 
occurrence of "blocking" among the insecure subjects and its 




The results of this study are based upon the per­
formances of two groups of subjects who were significantly 
different from each other with regard to general emotional 
security. Whatever generalizations one makes from the re­
sults of the study must necessarily be limited by the use 
of such extreme groups. There were several factors involved 
in the selection of the subjects which might cast additional 
light upon the nature of the experimental groups, prior to 
discussing the more general findings of the study.
Those subjects who made up the Insecure Group were 
individuals who demonstrated quite clearly that they were 
unhappy, dissatisfied, and greatly concerned with their ade­
quacy as individuals. On the S-I the individuals of the In­
secure Group gave "insecure" responses to over 50 per cent of 
the items and on the MCR they gave about as many "poor" re­
sponses as they did "good" responses. The mean score on the 
S-I ranked in the lowest 10 per cent of Mawlow's norms, with­
in the range which Maslow defines as "very insecure" (1952).
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The number of "poor" responses given on the MCR by each of 
the subjects was greater than the number narrower (1951) 
suggests to be indicative of emotional instability.
There were, however, many individuals within the 
population from which the experimental groups were drawn 
who might otherwise be judged insecure who did not meet the 
criteria of this study. Many in the population tested 
scored exceptionally high security scores on the S-I and 
very low scores on the MCR, suggesting that they might have 
been unwilling or unable to give an accurate picture of 
themselves. Perhaps these individuals would have performed 
quite differently on the experimental tasks.
The insecure subjects, then, are perhaps not repre­
sentative of all of those individuals within the population 
who would be clinically judged to be insecure. The subjects 
are perhaps best described as individuals who are insecure 
and who are consciously concerned with psychological prob­
lems .
The secure subjects, on the other hand, are neither 
self-actualizers nor ideally secure individuals. While they 
scored above average when compared with Maslow's norms, they 
did not as a group achieve the level which Maslow defines as 
"very secure"; and though their MCR performance was within 
the top 15 per cent of the population of psychology students, 
they averaged as many as five "poor" responses.
6o
Thus while the Insecure Group appeared to consist of 
markedly insecure individuals, the Secure Group probably 
consisted of individuals who are only relatively secure 
and certainly not self-actualizers.
In some respects, the subjects defined as insecure 
by this study are probably those most likely to seek pro­
fessional help, since they appear to have a painful aware­
ness that "all is not well," and they appear to be rather 
typical of college students who seek out guidance and coun­
seling services. There are, of course, great individual 
differences among insecure individuals, and the scope of 
this study does not permit generalization to all individuals 
with neurotic or psychotic problems.
Task
It was predicted that secure subjects would demon­
strate greater productivity than insecure subjects on a 
word chain association test, and the data reported in 
Chapter IV were consistent with this prediction. The se­
cure subjects produced significantly more associations to 
both stress and non-stress words than did the insecure 
subjects.
In response to non-stress words, the secure subjects 
not only demonstrated greater productivity, they typically 
demonstrated greater freedom and variability of response. 
They appeared to be less stimulus bound in their responses.
6i
The insecure subjects--notwithstanding the fact that they 
were instructed to verbalize any word that occurred to them 
during the association period, whether or not it had any 
obvious relationship to the stimulus word--were characteris­
tically bound to the stimulus. They avoided being or were 
unable to be "unrealistic," imaginative, or illogical in 
their responses. They made an effort to produce synonyms 
or closely associated words, while more generally the se­
cure subjects ranged farther and wider in their responses.
The following examples may serve to illustrate the
point ;
Insecure Subject. RICH; money . . . wealthy . . . 
millionaire . . .  dollars . . . capital . . . (long 
pause).
Secure Sub ject. RICH: wealthy . . . car . . .
yacht . . .  travel . . .  Europe . . . Paris . . .  eat
. . . drink . . .  fish . .  . hunt . . . (pause).
The qualitative difference between these two chain 
associations is that the former represents a word-naming 
process, a search for logical responses, while the latter 
represents the freedom of fantasy with the stimulus word 
being used more or less as a springboard for the imagina­
tion, The latter seems to represent a more personalized 
expression of the individual, the former remains a somewhat 
detached recitation.
The behavior of the insecure subjects in general ap­
peared to be field dependent, lacking the internal freedom 
and flexibility to be more individualistic. Therefore, the
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differences which existed between the two groups were more 
than merely quantitative, and the qualitative differences 
seem to be equally consistent with the idea that secure in­
dividuals can more freely accept into awareness ideas and 
associations arising within them. They are not much on 
guard against personalized associations.
These qualitative differences were observations made 
by the examiner, and no attempt was made to get systematic 
judgments regarding these differences; however, the exami­
ner’s impressions were consistent with those of the clinical 
judges who were used to evaluate Task II.
It was also predicted that both groups would show a 
decrease in responses when associating to stress words, and 
such was the case. There was a significant decrease in pro­
ductivity in both the Secure and Insecure Groups when the 
stimulus was a stress word. In addition to the quantitative 
differences between reactions to the stress and non-stress 
words, there were noticeable qualitative differences. The 
secure subjects seemed to become more bound to the stimulus, 
and the freedom of their associations was somewhat con­
stricted, as if the stimulus were such as to "put them on 
guard." Such differences were not so discernible with the 
insecure subjects since their associations to the non-stress 
words were so stimulus bound to begin with.
The third prediction was not supported by the data. 
It was hypothesized that the secure subjects would show less
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decrease in productivity from non-stress to stress words 
than the insecure subjects, but in terms of the data the 
amount of decrease for the two groups was quite similar.
That stress would have the same effect on secure and inse­
cure subjects is inconsistent with Collier’s theory, and one 
must question whether the results represent a weakness of 
the theory or an inadequacy within the design of the experi­
ment. In the light of the other results of this study, it 
would seem that additional study is necessary in order to 
evaluate the differential effect of stress on secure and 
insecure individuals before drawing conclusions about the 
adequacy of the theory. It must be said, however, that the 
results in this instance were inconsistent with Collier’s 
theory.
In considering the fact that the third hypothesis 
was not supported, the nature of the samples seems impor­
tant. All subjects were college students, primarily in the 
late teens, during which time there is characteristic con­
cern over emotions, how to handle one’s emotions and even 
how to talk about them. Words relating to emotional pro­
cesses which elicited associations having to do with sex, 
hostility, or pain were constricting because they probably 
gave rise to stressful associations. The resulting effect 
was a significant decrease in productivity for both Secure 
and Insecure Groups.
6^
Thus while the secure subjects demonstrated greater 
productivity on Task I, they also encountered stress suffi­
cient to bring about a loss of productivity to about the 
same degree as that of the Insecure Group.
It was also found that verbal ability, as measured 
by the OSPE, was not a significant factor in performance on 
the chain association test. While the OSPE provides a meas­
ure of vocabulary, it is perhaps best described as a test 
of academic ability, and it is a good predictor of grades 
in college. Thus it can be concluded that intellectual 
factors do not play a significant role in determining the 
kind of verbal fluency or productivity which was measured 
by the chain association task. Although there were no sig­
nificant differences among the various decile groups, it is 
interesting to note that those subjects who fell within the 
lowest decile group in the Secure Group, produced more asso­
ciations than those subjects within the highest decile 
group. The general conclusion from studying the results of 
the various analyses of variance concerned with verbal abil­
ity is that productivity of the chain association test is 
largely determined by non-intellectual factors.
Task II
In their performance on Task II, as evaluated by the 
clinical judges, the secure individuals demonstrated signifi­
cantly more spontaneous expression, greater tolerance for
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complying with, the task, and a wider variety of content.
Thus the three hypotheses concerned with Task II were sup­
ported. The following discussion of Task II is based in 
part upon the combined impressions of the clinical judges, 
with whom the writer talked at length following the comple­
tion of the ratings.
Spontaneity. The difference between the two experi­
mental groups as measured by the spontaneity scale was high­
ly significant. The most pronounced reaction of the insecure 
subjects was "blocking," saying very little and remarking 
that nothing occurred to them. Three of the insecure sub­
jects "blocked" completely and said nothing for the five- 
minute period except something to the effect that their mind 
was a blank. Other insecure subjects talked fluently for 
the first two or three minutes and then "ran out of anything 
to say."
Lack of spontaneity among the insecure subjects, as 
well as among some of the secure subjects, was also seen in 
what the judges described as "dry" or "flat" or "controlled" 
responses, with the subjects talking in a rather restrained, 
unassertive way, which lacked feeling and emotional involve­
ment. Other subjects showed a great deal of involvement, 
enthusiasm, and openness in responding to the directions to 
free associate. Three of the insecure subjects received 
ratings which were above the mean for the Secure Group, and 
it is interesting to note that these three subjects also
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produced highly personalized verbalizations, the material 
apparently representing personal matters of pressing con­
cern. It seemed as though they were motivated to talk about 
certain aspects of their own personalities for the purpose 
of deriving some benefit from the free association situation.
One factor which might have had a bearing on the out­
come of the ratings was the impression among the judges that 
variables other than the experimental ones might have ex­
erted an influence on their judgments. It was not an easy 
matter to disregard content, for instance, in rating the 
subjects' degree of spontaneity. If the subjects produced 
only that which was regarded as trivia, such as biographical 
detail, there might have been a tendency to lower the spon­
taneity ratings. While in most cases it seemed that sub­
jects who produced such content were also less spontaneous, 
such was not invariably the case. The fact, however, that 
the judges were aware of this tendency hopefully served to 
minimize its influence.
Tolerance. While "blocking" was the most charac­
teristic behavior with regard to spontaneity, over-intellec- 
tualized responses and the avoidance of personalized content 
was the most characteristic approach with regard to complying 
with the directions to free associate. While the difference 
between the two experimental groups was statistically sig­
nificant (P = .05)i the difference does not reach the level 
of confidence which was attained on the other two scales.
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spontaneity and variability (P = .01).
The behavior exhibited during the free association 
task was frequently that which can be described as defen­
sive, referring to the use of secondary defenses. Such be­
havior included rationalization ("It's just too early in the 
morning for me to have any thoughts"), intellectualization 
("It is interesting to speculate on what ideas will occur 
to me . . . i n  this vacuum that I laughingly call my mind"),
or externalization ("This is a large office and there are 
pictures on the wall and a lot of books"). Such behavior 
was found among both secure and insecure individuals, al­
though more pronounced--as evidenced in the ratings--among 
the insecure subjects. Some subjects showed more active 
resistance to free associating by repeatedly asking ques­
tions or making remarks about the absurdity of the task; 
however, no subject refused to make an effort, and even 
among those who "blocked" completely their behavior did not 
seem to reflect an active refusal but rather an inability.
By way of interpretation, it seemed that most of 
the subjects did not have to resort to drastic methods 
(primary defenses) such as "blocking" to cope with the task, 
but did resort to secondary defenses. And while they avoided 
the marked constriction that is seen in "blocking," they 
failed to present much in the way of direct and personalized 
associations. While some subjects received relatively high 
ratings of spontaneity, they received much lower ratings on
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tolerance.
On the other hand, some insecure subjects who demon­
strated a lack of spontaneity presented highly personalized 
content, sometimes talking of personal problems, and they 
received significantly higher ratings on tolerance. For 
the most part, their verbalizations, however personal, were 
void of feelings and apparent involvement; their speech was 
controlled and restrained. This behavior was responsible 
for the low spontaneity ratings. Since they did not avoid 
personal ideas, feelings, attitudes, problems, etc., they 
received higher tolerance ratings.
Ratings on the tolerance scale were complicated by 
the idea among the judges that various levels of resistance 
were involved, and while on the surface a subject might ap­
pear to be actively complying with the task, his responses 
were too glib and superficial to reflect much of him as an 
individual. This was true of several subjects in the Secure 
Group, who received higher ratings on spontaneity than on 
tolerance.
Thus while something in the way of a "halo effect" 
might have been influencing the judges’ ratings, a close 
inspection of the mean ratings suggests that such an effect 
was not consistent, and there is reason to believe— since 
the judges were all experienced psychotherapists--that it 
was not a significant factor.
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Variability. The most frequent content presented 
by the insecure subjects was of a biographical nature, some 
subjects limiting their verbalizations to a factual account 
of their experiences ("I was born on July 3, 19^0> and 
started school at Horace Mann grade school when 1 was six"). 
And while such responses were not atypical of the secure 
subjects, it was infrequent that a secure subject limited 
his responses to such factual data. More frequently the 
secure subject would interject attitudes and value judg­
ments, as well as his concerns of the moment and his plans 
for the future.
The insecure subject appeared to seek structure, 
such as the structure of a detailed biography or the descrip­
tion of his dormitory room, and while within this structure 
there was some variety of detail, he received a lower rating 
on variability than did the subject who talked of memories, 
attitudes, convictions, etc., with no over-all structure.
The secure subject frequently was concerned with 
presenting a picture of himself ("I'm the kind of guy who"), 
while the insecure subject most often seemed to avoid pre­
senting anything other than a skeleton of detail. Conse­
quently, variability was related most closely to spontane­
ity. The subject who could move from one idea to another 
freely and easily was more spontaneous; while the subject 
who lacked this freedom was less spontaneous. So the extent 
of the differences between the two groups was about the same
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with regard to both spontaneity and variability of re­
sponses .
General Discussion
The differences between the two experimental groups 
with reference to verbal productivity, freedom of expres­
sion, and variability of content, on both the chain associ­
ation task and the free association task, suggest that the 
secure subjects could more readily accept at the conscious 
level their experiences of the moment and assimilate them 
in some meaningful way. These results are interpreted as a 
function of the secure individual's greater consciousness 
of himself; thoughts, feelings, memories, and attitudes have 
freer access to the conscious field.
The insecure subject, who by definition is not on 
such acceptable terms with himself, had a more difficult 
time in "letting himself go," in freely accepting into 
awareness and expressing his uniquely personal reactions to 
the experimental tasks. From an interpretive point of view, 
the insecure subjects' limited productivity and freedom of 
expression reflect the inner constriction and guardedness 
which prevent ideas and feelings from readily becoming a 
part of the stream of consciousness. It is assumed that 
one who has grave doubts about his own adequacy and worth 
as an individual must erect barricades to prevent him from 
revealing to himself and to others those phenomena which
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constitute the self. He becomes more acutely concerned 
about the nature and the quality of his experiences, which, 
in turn, constricts and limits what he can accept into 
awareness.
With regard to the results of this study, some ob­
servations can be made with regard to the free association 
technique;
First, insecure individuals lack the freedom and 
flexibility to demonstrate much in the way of spontaneous 
expression of feelings and ideas. The free association 
situation provokes such reactions as "blocking," depersona­
lization, and attempts to achieve something in the way of 
non-threatening structure on which the individual can anchor 
his thoughts. These typical reactions appear to be defenses 
used by the individual to help him avoid revealing a self 
which he considers to be inferior, "bad," or whatever.
Second, the determinants of free association ability 
are primarily of an emotional nature rather than of an in­
tellectual nature. Free association is not primarily an 
intellectual activity for which sheer verbal ability equips 
the individual. It should be pointed out, however, that 
this study dealt with individuals who probably represent 
only the upper 50 per cent of the general population with 
regard to verbal ability, and there might well be differ­
ences within the lower levels.
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Third, free association apparently creates addi­
tional stress for the insecure individual in that it focuses 
threatening attention upon himself and requires that he re­
veal himself. Without the security of the structure which 
is present in most social situations, the insecure individ­
ual loses much of his verbal fluency and articulateness.
He has not had time to review or think through his state­
ments, and this seems to create additional stress. The 
added stress, in turn, becomes an added restriction to con­
scious experience. Particularly when issues which produce 
affect are encountered, there is a reduction of freedom, a 
tendency to avoid emotions.
The data of this study do not provide a basis for 
evaluating the free association technique as a psychothera­
peutic tool, but they do furnish the basis for some gener­
alizations with regard to Collier’s theory.
Collier (1956) states that the less tolerance for 
stress which the individual might have the more he must 
rely on primary defenses. It was observed in the present 
study that the more insecure individuals relied most fre­
quently on such reactions as "blocking" in coping with the 
free association situation; and when stress became greater, 
"blocking" became more frequent. The more secure individ­
uals resorted to less extreme and more appropriate defenses.
The use of free association as a therapeutic tech­
nique requests that the individual do that which he has
73
characteristically avoided. It requests that he encounter 
himself, that he actualize experiences which he has denied 
from awareness. He cannot do this without encountering 
stress.
In the psychotherapeutic situation the strengthening 
relationship between the therapist and client, and the 
client*s motivation to become a more effective person, will 
hopefully lead to a greater tolerance for stress and a 
greater ability to encounter onself.
It was observed in this study that certain insecure 
subjects would appear to be relatively free and fluent in 
their associations, and in the process of associating would 
verbalize, apparently before censoring them, certain thoughts 
which were of a highly personal nature, and which appeared 
to create sufficient stress to bring about pronounced "block­
ing." Ideas came into awareness which the subject could not 
readily handle. In Collier's language, this reflects the 
difference between permeability of the conscious field and 
ego strength. The concept of permeability refers to the 
access which phenomena have to the conscious field, while 
ego strength is characterized not only by the availability 
of phenomena to the conscious field but also by the assimi­
lation of such phenomena constructively.
The implication here is that certain individuals 
who may gain some premature security in the therapeutic re­
lationship may have a flooding of consciousness with feelings
7k
and thoughts which cannot be constructively assimilated, 
and the consequence may be overwhelming anxiety and a re­
treat to drastic defense measures. This limits the effec­
tive use of free association to those who have enough ego 
strength to begin with to make constructive use of it. 
Psychotic patients who may develop great permeability of 
consciousness without having a modicum of ego strength can­
not generally benefit from the free association method and 
may at times demonstrate acute reactions to free associa­
tion.
Since none of the subjects in the present study was 
severely disturbed, i.e., psychotic or near-psychotic, ad­
ditional experimental data are necessary to cast further 
light upon the differential reactions to free association.
Conclusions
The data of this study supported the hypotheses that 
emotionally secure individuals demonstrate greater ability 
to free associate than do insecure individuals, and that 
stress serves to reduce the freedom of association for both 
secure and insecure individuals. These findings are consis­
tent with Collier's theory, as well as with the main stream 
of thought among students of personality and psychotherapy.
The hypotheses are based upon the theory that the 
degree to which an individual can accept into awareness 
relevant aspects of himself is an indication of how effective
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he will be in regulating his own behavior and in actualiz­
ing his potentialities as a human being. The more sec..re 
individual has a greater ability to accept into awareness 
his experience of himself in relation to the world around 
him; while the insecure individual avoids or is unable to 
demonstrate such self acceptance.
It must be recognized that the data, while confirming 
the predictions, do not directly validate this theoretical 
statement and do not preclude other theoretical explanations 
of the observed behavior. If the results had been negative, 
one might be inclined to reject the theory; in the light of 
positive results, one can only say that the observed behav­
ior is consistent with the theory.
One might say, as an alternative explanation, that 
the insecure subjects did not have any less permeability of 
the conscious field but were merely reluctant or unable to 
verbalize what they consciously experienced. This explana­
tion assumes that there is no difference between secure and 
insecure individuals with respect to what might be called 
internal freedom--the freedom to accept phenomena into 
awareness. The major shortcoming of such an explanation is 
that it is not consistent with our accumulated knowledge of 
personality. It does not have the "goodness of fit" with 
respect to both clinical and theoretical approaches to 
personality.
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Wtiat we ascribe to consciousness must necessarily be 
by a process of inference, since the processes of conscious­
ness are beyond the reach of direct measurement. It is not 
known and cannot be empirically demonstrated that all or 
even most of the subjects were willing or able to verbalize 
everything which occurred to them. Certain associations 
were probably left unsaid because of concern over what was 
socially appropriate or inappropriate. One cannot measure 
the discrepancy between what is consciously experienced and 
what is verbalized. It was assumed that those subjects who 
verbalized the greater number of associations had a more 
expansive field of assooiations from which to draw their 
verbalizations.
While the role of the concept of consciousness is 
becoming increasingly important in the light of the modern 
influence of ego psychology and, more recently, existential 
analysis, we are limited in what we can know and what we 
can learn about consciousness to that which can be inferred 
from observable behavior. If observed behavior is consis­
tent with a given theory and if the theory aids in the 
understanding of human behavior and experience, then it has 
utility as theory. Much of contemporary personality theory 
must wait for the crucial test until the science of psy­
chology can develop more direct methods and techniques of 
investigation. Until then the ultimate test of much of 
psychological theory must be the degree to which the theory
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permits a meaningful, reliable, and consistent way of 




Collier's theory of consciousness as a regulatory 
field was used as the basis for several predictions con­
cerning the differential free association ability of secure 
and insecure subjects. On the basis of Collier's theory, 
which reflects some widely accepted beliefs in contemporary 
dynamic psychology, it was predicted that emotionally secure 
individuals would demonstrate greater productivity and flex­
ibility in free association behavior than would insecure 
individuals, in that the former can more readily accept into 
awareness the ideas, feelings, thoughts, and memories which 
constitute the self. In addition, it was predicted that the 
introduction of stress would bring about a decrease in free­
dom of expression, as reflected in decreased verbal produc­
tivity, and that such decrease in productivity would be 
greater for the insecure subjects than for the secure.
Two hundred and ninety-eight male students enrolled 
in an introductory course in psychology were administered 
the Maslow Security-Insecurity Inventory and a modified form 
of the narrower Multiple Choice Rorschach Test. On the basis
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of the test results, two groups of subjects, matched on the 
basis of verbal ability as measured by the Ohio State Psy­
chological Examination, were selected as the Secure arid 
Insecure Groups. The experimental procedure was identical 
for both groups.
The experiment consisted of two tasks, a chain asso­
ciation test which consisted of 10 non-stress stimulus words 
and 10 stress stimulus words, taken from the Jung Word Asso­
ciation Test, and a free association task, for which the 
subject was given the usual therapeutic instructions to free 
associate. The results of the chain association test were 
evaluated in terms of the number of responses to the stimu­
lus words, the results being analyzed by analysis of vari­
ance. The data from the free association period were evalu­
ated by clinical judges who rated the subjects on three 
nine-point scales: spontaneity, tolerance, and variability.
Spontaneity was defined as the freedom of expression; toler­
ance as the ability to cope with the task without resorting 
to such defenses as repeated questioning, rationalization, 
or any form of overt resistance; variability referred to the 
freedom in the range of content. The judges* ratings were 
checked for reliability using product-moment correlations 
and were analyzed by the use of analysis of variance.
The productivity of the Secure Group on the chain 
association test was significantly greater than that of the 
Insecure Group (P = .001) in response to both stress and
80
non-stress words. Both, groups showed significant decrease 
when responding to stress words; however, the difference 
between the two groups in terms of the amount of decrease 
was not significant. On the free association task, the 
Secure Group demonstrated significantly greater spontaneity, 
tolerance, and variability in their performance than the 
Insecure Group.
There were also salient qualitative differences be­
tween the two groups, in that the secure individuals were 
more personalized, flexible, and less bound to external 
stimuli. While "blocking” was a frequent occurrence among 
the insecure individuals, it was not pronounced among the 
secure individuals; rather the secure individuals appeared 
to be more prone to use intellectualization and deperson­
alization instead of more extreme measures, such as "block­
ing. "
It was concluded that secure individuals, when com­
pared with insecure individuals, have greater ability to 
accept into awareness the various phenomena which constitute 
the self at any moment and thus are able to demonstrate 
greater freedom, productivity, and flexibility in their be­
havior. Insecure individuals are constricted and restrained 
in an unstructured situation which demands that they react 
on the basis of their personal experience of the moment. 
Stress serves to bring about added constriction and de­
creased productivity for both secure and insecure individuals.
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Additional experimental evidence concerning the 
performance of severely disturbed individuals, such as 
psychotics, would be valuable; and also evidence concern­
ing the performance of exceptionally secure and stable in­
dividuals would shed additional light upon the matter of 
conscious freedom and flexibility. Since the secure indi­
viduals in this study were college students, there might 
exist significant difference between this group and a group 
of more mature and stable individuals, who have come closer 
to the actualization of their potentialities.
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If your answer to any of the following questions is 
"yes," please mark the answer space which is under the num­
ber 1 [on the IBM answer sheets * If your answer is "No," 
please mark the answer space under the number 2.
1. Do you ordinarily like to be with people rather than 
alone?
2. Do you have social ease?
3. Do you lack self-confidence?
k. Do you feel that you get enough praise?
5. Do you often have a feeling of resentment against the 
world?
6. Do you think people like you as much as they do others?
7. Do you worry too long over humiliating experiences?
8. Can you be comfortable with yourself?
9* Are you generally an unselfish person?
10. Do you tend to avoid unpleasantness by running away?
11. Do you often have a feeling of loneliness even when 
you are with people?
12. Do you feel that you are getting a square deal in life?
13. When your friends criticize you, do you usually take 
it well?
1^. Do you get discouraged easily?
15. Do you usually feel friendly toward most people?
16 . Do you often feel that life is not worth living?
17. Are you generally optimistic?
18. Do you consider yourself a rather nervous person?
19. Are you in general a happy person?
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20. Are you ordinarily quite sure of yourself?
21. Are you often self-conscious?
22. Do you tend to be dissatisfied with yourself?
23. Are you frequently in low spirits?
24. When you meet people for the first time do you usually 
feel they will not like you?
25. Do you have enough faith in yourself?
26. Do you feel in general most people can be trusted?
27. Do you feel that you are useful in the world?
28. Do you ordinarily get on well with others?
29. Do you spend much time worrying about the future?
30. Do you usually feel well and strong?
31. Are you a good conversationalist?
32. Do you have the feeling of being a burden to others?
33» Do you have difficulty in expressing your feelings?
34. Do you usually rejoice in the happiness or good
fortune of others?
33. Do you often feel left out of things?
36. Do you tend to be a suspicious person?
37. Do you ordinarily think of the world as a nice place
to live in?
38. Do you get upset easily?
39• Do you think of yourself often?
40. Do you feel that you are living as you please rather
than as someone else pleases?
41. Do you feel sorrow and pity for yourself when things 
go wrong?
42. Do you feel that you are a success at your work or 
your job?
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^3. Do you ordinarily let people see what you are really 
like?
^4. Do you feel that you are not satisfactorily adjusted 
to life?
^5- Do you ordinarily proceed on the assumption that things 
usually tend to turn out all right?
46. Do you feel that life is a great burden?
4?. Are you troubled with feelings of inferiority?
48. Do you generally feel "good"?
49. Do you get along well with the opposite sex?
50. Are you ever troubled with an idea that people are
watching you on the street?
51• Are you easily hurt?
52 , Do you feel at home in the world?
53» Do you worry about your intelligence?
54, Do you generally put others at their ease?
55. Do you have a vague fear of the future?
36. Do you behave naturally?
57* Do you feel that you are generally lucky?
58. Did you have a happy childhood?
59. Do you have many real friends?
60. Do you feel restless most of the time?
61. Do you tend to be afraid of competition?
62. Is your home environment happy?
63. Do you worry too much about possible misfortune?
64. Do you often become very annoyed with people?
65. Do you ordinarily feel contented?
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66. Do your moods tend to alternate from very happy to 
very sad?
67. Do you feel that you are respected by people in 
general?
68. Are you able to work harmoniously with others?
69. Do you feel you can't control your feelings?
70. Do you sometimes feel that people laugh at you?
71. Are you generally a relaxed person (rather than 
tense)?
72. On the whole do you think you are treated right by 
the world?
73. Are you ever bothered by a feeling that things are 
not real?
?k. Have you often been humiliated?




Modification of narrower’s Multiple Choice 
Rorschach Test for Group Administration
Instructions ; You are going to be shown a series of ten 
inkblot pictures one after another. Begin by taking a good 
look at Inkblot I and see if it, or any part of it, reminds 
you of anything or resembles something you have seen. Then 
read through each of the three groups of answers for Ink­
blot I. Those are the groups numbered 1, 2, 3. Now, by 
using the answer sheet which has been passed out to you, 
mark what you consider to be the one best answer in Group 1 
in the first answer space, the best answer in Group 2 in 
the second answer space, and the best answer in Group 3 in 
the third answer space. You will then have filled in three 
answers for Inkblot 1. Then do exactly the same thing for 
each of the other inkblots. There are no right or wrong 
answers. Your personal reaction is what counts.
Inkblot I
(1 ) (2) (3)
1. An Army or Navy 1. A headless 1. A Halloween
emblem (g) * figure (g) mask (g)
2. Crumbling cliffs 2. Spilt ink (p) 2. Storm clouds
(p) (p)
3« A bat (g) 3. Someone’s in­ 3. X-ray of spine
sides (hp) (hp)
4. Nothing at all 4. Vertebrae (g) 4. Two people (g)
(p)
5. An X-ray pic­ 5. Nothing at 5. Nothing at all
ture (hp) all (p) (p)
Inkblot II
(4) (5) (6)
1. Nothing at all 1. An animal 1. Two witches (g)
(p) skipping (hp)2. Two scottie 2. Two bears rub­ 2. Black and red
dogs (g) bing noses (g) paint (p)
3. A bursting bomb 3. Blood (p) 3. Lungs and blood
(hp) (hp)
4. Two elephants 4. Two people 4. Bears heads (g)
(g) playing (g)
5. Red and black 5. Nothing at all 5. Nothing at all
ink (p) (p) (p)
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Inkblot III
(7) (8 ) (9)
1. Two birds fight­ 1. Two cannibals 1. Two birds’
ing (g) (g) heads (g)
2. Just colored 2. Fire and smoke 2. Waiters bow­
blots (p) (hp) ing (g)
3. Two men pulling 3. Blood and dirt 3. Lipstick
• • 0 ( g ) (p) splotches (hp)4". Spots of blood 4. Donald Ducks Dirty spots and
and paint (hp) (g) bloody spots (p)




1. A pair of boots 1. The spine (hp) 1. Clouds (hp)
(g)
2. A burnt mass (p) 2. Dirty water (p) 2. A hat (g)
3. Lungs and chest 3. A fur rug (g) 3. Nothing at all
(hp) (p)Nothing at all Ip. A man sitting k’, A cow’s head (g)
(p) down (g)5. A giant in a 5. Nothing at all 5. A frightening
fur coat (g) (p) picture (p)
Inkblot V
(13) (14) (15)
1. A bird’s beak 1. A man’s face (g) lo An alligator’s
(g) head (g)
2. Something 2. A black mess (p) 2 c Nothing at all
squashed (p) (p)3. Nothing at all 3. A bird flying 3. A fan dancer (g)
(P) , ^ (g)1̂ . A moth (g) 4. A pelvis (hp) 4. Black clouds (p)




(16) (17) (1 8)
1. Two kings’ heads 1. A dragonfly 1. An X-ray of the
(g) (g) spine (hp)2. An X-ray picture 2. A spinal column 2c A butterfly at
(hp) (hp) the top (g)
3. A fur rug (g) 3. Dirty water (p) 3 = Nothing at all
(p)4. A landslide (p) 4. An animal skin 4. A little man
(g) (g)




1. Smoke (hp) 1. A butterfly at 1. The lower part
the bottom (g) of the body (hp)
2. Two women 2. Dirt from a 2, Children
talking (g) gutter (p) playing (g)
3. Nothing at all 3. Scotties (g) 3. A squashed frog
(P) (p)4. Animals (g) 4. A pelvis (hp) 4. A moth (g)
5. Burning frag­ 5. Nothing at all 5. Nothing at all
ments (p) (p) (p)
Inkblot VIII
(22) (23) (24)
1. Nothing at all 1. flowers and 1. A Christmas
(p) leaves (g) tree (g)2. An orange or pink 2. An X-ray 2. A medical
butterfly (g) picture (hp) picture (hp)
3. Colored clouds 3. Two animals 3. Nothing at all
(hp) climbing (g) (p)4. Two bears 4. Nothing at all 4. Frogs’ heads
climbing (g) (p) is)






I. Sea horses (g) 2. Nothing at all 1. Lobsters (g)
(P)2. Just spilt 3o A pink jacket 2. The inside of a
paint (p) (g) person (hp)
3. Flowers (g) 3. Just colors 3. Nothing at all
(p) (p)4. Smoke and 4. Tropical plants 4. Messy colors
flames (hp) (g) (p)5. Nothing at all 5. The stomach and 5. Two Santa
(p) intestines (bp) Clauses (g)
Inkblot X
(28) (29) (30)
1. Two people (g) 1. A lot of colors 1. A blue flower
(P) (g)2. Spilt paint 2. A medical 2. Colored ink
(hp) picture (hp) (bp)
3. A flower 3. Undersea 3. Just colors
garden (g) picture (g) (p)4. Colored ink 4. Nothing at all L, Octopus and
spots (p) (p) crabs (g)5. Nothing at all 5. Lots of ani­ 5. Nothing at all
(p) mals running (p)around (g)
The letters following each answer did not appear 
on the actual test. The letters have the following mean­
ings: is a good response, is a poor response, and
hjD is a half-poor response.
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Appendix C
Total Number of Responses Given by Secure and 
Insecure Subjects on Task I, Arranged by 
OSPE Decile Grouping
OSPE
Secure Group Insecure Group
Non-Stress Stress Non-Stress Stress
1-2 64 53 48 34
96 90 54 55
98 89 57 46
3-4 79 70 67 46
67 46 64 54
70 47 54 37
76 60 48 4l
5-6 67 56 56 38
55 42 47 37
129 43 77 47
86 67 67 45
4-8 95 77 62 35
96 78 53 36
47 42 49 27
82 54 46 31
86 71 66 55
91 60 4i 34
9-10 49 4? 64 46
70 54 72 60
48 46 38 21
81 56 62 67
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Appendix D
Analysis of Variance of the Effect of 
OSPE Decile Grouping on Task I
A. Secure Subjects on Non-Stress Task
Source Sum of Squares df
Variance
Estimate F P
Between 16.10 k 4.02 .995 n . s.
Within 6^.51 16 4.o4
Total 80.61 20
®-Not significan t .
B. Secure Subjects on Stress Task
Source Sum of Squares df
Variance
Estimate F P
Between 16.51 4 4.01 2.31 n. s.
Within 27.85 16 1.74
Total 44.36 20
C. Insecure Subjects on Non-Stress Task
Source Sum of Squares df
Variance
Estimate F P
Between 3.15 4 .79 .632 n.s.
Within 20.01 16 1.25
Total 23.16 20
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D. Insecure Subjects on Stress Task
Source Sum of Squares df
Variance
Estimate F P
Between 3.31 4 .825 .427 n.s.








Judges r_ jt P
1 and 2 .9^ 11.19 .001
1 and 3 .92 9.68 .001
2 and 3 .80 5.71 .001
B. Secure Subjects
Judges p
1 and 2 .72 4.64 .001
1 and 3 .64 3.44 .01
2 and 3 .93 10.33 .001
2. Tolerance Scale
A. Insecure Subjects
Judges r_ jt p
1 and 2 .68 3.82 .01
1 and 3 .67 3.72 .01
2 and 3 .80 5.71 .001
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B. Secure Subjects
Judges r_ ;t P
1 and 2 .57 2.86 .02
1 and 3 .91 9.10 .001
2 and 3 .63 3.35 .01
3. Variability Scale
A. Insecure Subjects
Judges r_ t. p
1 and 2 .85 6.64 .001
1 and 3 .76 4.78 .001
2 and 3 .59 3.03 .01
B. Secure Subjects
Judges r_ t p
1 and 2 .72 4.64 .001
1 and 3 .49 2.33 .05
2 and 3 .61 3.18 .01
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Appendix F
Judges’ Ratings of Secure Subjects on Task II
Judge 1 Judge 2 Judge 3 Mean
S T ya S T V S T V s T V
4 2 2 2 6 2 6 1 2 4.00 3.00 2.00
3 4 6 2 1 5 4 3 3 3.00 2.67 4.67
7 8 7 6 4 7 7 7 8 6.67 6.33 7.33
1 3 6 6 1 6 5 1 8 4.00 1.67 6 0 67
7 2 8 8 1 6 8 1 7 7.67 1.33 7.00
8 9 9 9 8 9 9 8 9 8.67 8.33 9.006 5 4 6 6 4 7 3 3 6.33 4.67 3.67
8 9 7 8 8 6 8 8 7 8.00 8.33 6.67
7 8 9 7 7 8 4 8 5 6.00 7.67 7.33
7 8 8 6 7 6 7 7 7 6.67 7.33 7.00
3 8 8 2 8 7 2 7 2 2.33 7.67 5.67
6 1 1 7 3 3 8 3 4 7.00 2.33 2.67
7 4 6 8 7 8 7 2 5 7.33 4.33 6.334 3 2 4 6 7 4 3 8 4.00 4.00 5.67
5 9 9 7 8 8 8 8 9 6.67 8.33 8.674 6 5 1 2 2 1 3 4 2.00 3.67 3.67
7 2 3 6 6 1 5 1 2 6.00 3.00 2.00
8 5 4 8 3 5 8 2 3 8.00 3.33 4.00
6 5 6 5 4 5 6 4 5 5.67 4.33 5.33
®-S = Spontaneity 




Judges’ Ratings of Insecure Subjects on Task II
Judge 1 Judge 2 Judge 3 Mean
S T V S T V S T V 5 T V
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1.00 1.00 1.00
6 1 6 5 1 6 6 2 5.33 5.67 1.33
2 2 6 3 3 7 1 1 4 2.00 2.00 5.67
1 6 1 1 1 4 3 2 1 1.67 3.00 2.00
1 2 5 2 1 3 4 3 2 2.33 2.00 3.33
2 3 2 2 3 1 2 5 1.67 2.33 4.00
2 3 2 1 1 2 1 2 1 1.33 2.00 1.67
1 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1.00 1.67 1.00
5 3 4 8 3 5 7 3 3 6.67 3.00 4.00
3 7 2 3 8 2 2 7 1 2.67 7.33 3.67
5 6 8 7 5 5 7 7 7 6.33 6.00 7.00
3 7 4 3 4 3 7 7 5 4.33 6.00 5.00
1 2 7 1 1 6 1 2 6 1.00 1.67 6.33
2 6 1 3 2 1 3 1 1 2.67 3.00 1.00
3 1 6 2 1 6 2 1 6 2.33 1.00 6.00
8 3 2 8 3 2 8 8 8 8.00 4.67 4.00
1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 1.00 1.33 1.67
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1.00 1.00 1.00
3 6 8 4 4 5 9 7 9 5.33 5.67 7.33
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Appendix H
Analysis of Variance of the Effect of 
OSPE Decile Grouping on Task II
Secure Group
A. Spontaneity
Source Sum of Squares df
Variance
Estimate F P
Between 12.50 4 3.12 2.64 n. s.




Sum of VarianceSource Squares df Estimate E P
Between 4.54 4 1. l4 .233 n.s.
Within 68. l4 4.89
Total 72.98 18
C. Variability
Sum of VarianceSource Squares df Estimate F P
Between 3.81 4 .95 , 108 n.s.





Source Sum of Squares df
Variance
Estimate F P
Between 57.46 4 14.36 1.79 n.s.
Within 112.09 l4 8.01
Total 169.55 18
B. Tolerance
Sum of VarianceSource Squares df Estimate F P
Between 3.98 4 .99 .136 n.s.
Within 101.86 l4 7.27
Total 105.84 18
C. Variability
Sum of VarianceSource Squares df Estimate F P
Between 9.81 k 2.45 .459 n.s.
Within 74.67 l4 5.33
Total 84.48 ' 18
